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FACULTY COMMENT
FUTURE INTERESTS - The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to a
Pre-Emption. - Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297 (Colo.
1969).
T

HE opinion by Mr. Justice Groves is noteworthy because of the
sophistication with which it applies the rule against perpetuities
to a pre-emption.
The document which is determined to be governing provided that,
"in connection with the purchase of said land. . . by the City and as
part of the consideration of the sale thereof by the Atchisons ....
The City hereby gives and grants unto the Atchisons the exclusive and prior right at the option of the Atchisons to repurchase
. ..the lands ...at the same price and upon the same terms and conditions upon which the City is willing to sell ... said real estate...
to any third person ....
1
The rights of the Atchisons under this agreement shall be deemed
not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy in them and in the
survivor of
them, their assigns and the heirs and assigns of such
2
survivor."

It was held that the pre-emption thereby created was not personal
to the Atchisons; that it was therefore of unlimited duration; that it
was subject to the rule against perpetuities; that it was void for remoteness; and that therefore the summary judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
A large part of the opinion is devoted to the construction of the
documents and to a consideration of the argument that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment, but the part of the opinion
which is of the most general interest deals with the question of whether
the pre-emption is subject to the rule against perpetuities.
The opinion quotes Gray's statement of the rule, with its magnificently sweeping and misleading 3 phrase "[nJo interest is good," which
I Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 299-300 (Colo. 1969).
2

1d. at 300.

3The following "interests" have been held to be not subject to the rule: contractual
interests which do not create interests in other property, Caplan v. City of Pittsburgh,
375 Pa. 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953) ; rights of entry for condition broken, Hinton v. Gilbert, 221 Ala. 309, 128 So. 604 (1930) ; possibilities of reverter, Brown v. Independent
Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950); options to renew
a lease, Ehrhart v. Spencer, 175 Kan. 227, 263 P.2d 246 (1953) ; options by lessees to
buy, Hollander v. Central Metal and Supply Co. of Baltimore City, 109 Md. 131. 71 A.
442 (1908). As to common law contingent remainders there is a quaere. See KALES,
ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS IN ILLINOIS § 662 (1920).
See also Barry v. Newton - Perpetuities -Contingent Remainders - "If at All," 32
DICTA 7 (1955), where attention is called to the inconclusiveness of erroneous language
like that found in the opinion of the case now under consideration: "the rule a'sainst
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by itself provides a superficial answer; but the opinion does not stop
there. It recognizes that ordinary options are subject to the rule and
that a pre-emption is an option, 'but goes on to observe that a preemption is significantly different from an ordinary option:
An option given to a person, his heirs and assigns, to purchase land
for $5,000 with no limiting term is void under the rule against
perpetuities. The reason is that, with such an option outstanding the
owner dare not place substantial improvements on the land, and the
likelihood of anyone purchasing it is remote. The reason for application
of the rule against perpetuities to a pre-emptive right to purchase at
an offeror's price acceptable to the owner is not supported by the same
thus making the case for
reasoning as found in the option example,
4
non-application much more arguable.

The opinion then presents an exhaustive array of the authorities
on both sides of the question: the lumpers (All options are options and
are subject to the rule.) v. the hairsplitters (There are two kinds of
options, ordinary and pre-emptive, and the pre-emptive options are not

subject to the rule.)
The opinion follows the hairsplitters and surpasses them. They
split options into two kinds and say that pre-emptive options are not
within the rule. The opinion splits the remaining half hair into three
parts and says that there are three kinds of pre-emptive options: (1)
those which are created in such a way that the owner of the preemption could be identified by referring to the record title; (2) those
which are "restricted to a limited term found to be reasonable, albeit
longer than a life in being plus 21 years;" 5 and (3) those in which the
owner calnnot be so identified, and which are not limited to a reasonable term.
The opinion holds that the third kind of pre-emptive option is
subject to the rule even though the other two might not be, and finds
that the pre-emption granted to the Atchisons is of the third kind,
and therefore void:
We have held that before us is an inheritable pre-emptive right
without limit as to time. It is in no manner connected with any land
owned by Mr. and Mrs. Atchison.... [T]here will be no land title
interezt of record to give any clue as to the identity of future successors

in interest to the pre-emptive right. We feel that at some point in the
infinite time at which [the City] might in the future conclude to sell
the land, ascertaining and locating the owners of the pre-emptive right
would be an unreasonable task. As a result, there would be a sufficiently
unreasonable restraint upon the transferability of the property as to
justify imposition of the rule against perpetuities. It may be said that
perpetuities . . .has been applied in Colorado to certain contingent remainder interests."
Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 299 (Colo. 1969). See Rocky Mountain
Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 148 Colo. 415, 366 P.2d 577 (1961) ;Barry v. Newton, 130 Colo.
4
5

106. 273 P.2d 735 (1954). As a matter of fact, neither case dealt with a remainder. In
Fuel Co. it was an option, and in Barry, a springing executory interest.
Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 301-02 (Colo. 1969).

ld. at 303.
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we are stating a rule against alienation and giving it a label of the rule

against perpetuities. Be that as it may, the result is the same."
The acceptance of this invitation to criticize the theory of the
opinion turns out to be unrewarding. Since the reason for excluding
pre-emptions from the rule against perpetuities is that land subject to
a pre-emption is more readily alienable than land subject to an ordinary
option,7 it follows that the degree of alienability is a logical basis for
holding that some pre-emptions are subject to the rule even though
others may not be.
The same considerations take most of the shock out of the statement that "our conclusion might be different. . if [the pre-emption]
were.., limited [to a] term found to be reasonable,' albeit longer than
a life in being plus 21 years. ' 8 How could such a long term be found
to be reasonable? This is again a matter of the degree of alienability
sufficient to take a pre-emption out of the rule applicable to ordinary
options. There is a difference between a pre-emption granted "to A and
his heirs and assigns" and one "for a period of 25 years." The recognition of this difference as a basis for determining which pre-emptions are
subject to the rule against perpetuities does not change the basis of the
opinion from the rule against perpetuities to the rule against restraints
on alienation.
The opinion is therefore based upon a very narrow proposition,
namely, that when
an inheritable pre-emptive right without limit as to time.... [I]s in no
manner connected with any land .. . there will be no land title interest

of record to give any clue as to the identity of future successors in
interest. .

.

. [And] [als a result, there would be sufficiently un-

reasonable restraint upon the transferability of the property to justify

the imposition of the rule against perpetuities. 9

In the petition for rehearing, plaintiffs in error insisted that this
proposition did not afford a sufficient ground for distinguishing the
case of Weber v. Texas Co.10 which had held that a pre-emption was
not subject to the rule. The Colorado court is of course under no duty
to distinguish cases from other jurisdictions and cannot be criticized
for relying upon what might be called the Colorado rule.
However there would appear to be some logical difficulty in
applying this Colorado rule to a pre-emption concerning Colorado land.
6 id.

7 Other remote interests which have been held valid because of greater alienability are:
(1) those found in a revocable trust, Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461

(1958); (2) those subject to a general inter vivos power of appointment, Appeal of
Mifflin, 121 Pa. 205, 15 A. 525 (1888); and (3) those subject to the power of a
tenant in fee tail, Barber v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Ry. Co., 166 U.S. 83.
108 (1896).
8
Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 303 (Colo. 1969).
9Id.
1083 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936).
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An essential part of the rule is that "there will be no land title interest
".."The Colorado recording act provides that -[aIll ...
of record .
agreements or other instruments 'in writing ... encumbering or affecting the title to real property.. . may be recorded. .
This language
would seem to be broad enough to make a pre-emption itself recordable
in Colorado, and if within the recording act, then not within the Colorado rule.
In the introductory part of the opinion, unusual stress is laid upon
the fact that the phrase "if at all" is an important part of the orthodox
statement of the rule against perpetuities."l However, on the facts of
this case the inclusion or exclusion of the phrase would have made no
difference, and the Justice's remarks must be attributed to his inability
to repress his amusement at the spectacle of a professor admonishing
14
the court.
By T.G.M.

11Atchison

v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 303 (Colo. 1969).
§ 118-6-9 (1963). As a matter of fact, this pre-emption was
recorded. Brief of Plaintiffs in Error at 7, Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297
(Colo. 1969).
1 For an indication of the ease with which this sometimes crucial phrase is inadvertently
omitted, see Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act § 1, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 75-76
(1956). See also The Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act - "If at all," 11 PRAC. LAw.
No. 4, at 73 (1965), and this sentence by W. Barton Leach himself- "By classical theory
a future interest is void unless there is 'absolute certainty' that it will vest within
the period of perpetuities." Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts, and Prac12 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.

titioners Can Do About the Follies of the Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. REV. 351, 352 (1965).

14Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 299 (Colo. 1969).

